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Space Sustainability: Reframing the Debate 
 
Professor Christopher J. Newman (Northumbria Law School) 
Dr. Mark Williamson (Space Technology Consultant) 
 
1. Space activity and the sustainability vacuum.  
 
The nature of space activity has changed dramatically over the course of the last sixty years. 
Where once it was characterised by voyages of exploration beyond the Earth, the past three 
decades have seen a steady rise in commercial and private sector activity focused around low 
Earth orbit (LEO). Both the exploration and subsequent exploitation of space promised much 
in terms of satellite applications on Earth and (more ambitiously) by using the almost limitless 
mineral resources within our solar system1.  Yet such endeavours are not without cost and all 
periods of the Space Age have had a significant, cumulative impact upon the space 
environment near Earth2. The law and regulatory framework that could have addressed this 
environmental degradation has instead stagnated, with the dominant legal instrument for 
21st Century space exploration – the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 - predating humans landing 
on the Moon.  
 
The seriousness of the situation was summed up recently by Gerard Brachet, former chairman 
of the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), who 
wrote:  
 
“…our use of outer space since 1957 has been rather careless of its long-term 
sustainability. The situation might be compared to that of the 19th and 20th centuries 
with respect to maritime shipping and exploiting the oceans’ resources where there 
was a wilful ignorance of the negative impact of pollution and a general blindness to 
the long-term effects of over-fishing”3. 
 
In recent times, the need for a sustainable approach to space activity has gained increasing 
recognition within the space community. One reason that awareness of space as a fragile 
environment has improved is the increase in major debris-creating incidents in LEO, most 
significantly the deliberate destruction by the Chinese authorities of their Feng Yun 1C 
weather satellite in January 20074 and an unintentional collision, in February 2009, between 
the Iridium 33 commercial communications satellite and the defunct Russian Cosmos 2251 
spacecraft5.  
 
While it is laudable that issues such as debris mitigation and removal are at last being taken 
seriously for LEO, and at least considered for higher orbits such as geostationary orbit (GEO), 
the current debate appears to have become limited to the Earth’s immediate space 
environment.  There appears to be little consideration of the long-term sustainability of 
activities and operations in the wider space environment, particularly regarding forthcoming 
Moon and Mars exploration6. Within the next decade or two, if current plans come to fruition, 
there will be tele-operated rovers, scientific bases and perhaps even space tourists on the 
Moon; meanwhile, space entrepreneur Elon Musk has announced plans to establish a colony 
on Mars7.  
 
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in 1972 in Stockholm, is 
credited with bringing the concept of ‘sustainable development’ (of the terrestrial 
environment) to public attention, but the applicability of the concept to the space 
environment is still not broadly accepted in anything like the same way. Although the term 
‘sustainability’ has become increasingly common in space policy discourse, its applicability 
has been focused on a limited part of the space environment - chiefly low Earth orbit (LEO)8.  
 
This discussion will examine sustainability in LEO, where, despite the consensus that is 
emerging vis-à-vis the threat posed by orbital debris, there is little evidence of legislative or 
governmental action to ensure its broad applicability throughout the space environment. 
Having looked at where sustainability efforts are being concentrated, the inquiry will then 
attempt to move the debate beyond LEO, by highlighting some of the technical, legal and 
ethical issues that arise from human activity in both exploring and settling other celestial 
bodies. Finally, there will be analysis of some of the policy aspects and legal solutions that 
need to be established if humanity is to avoid replicating the environmentally harmful 
behaviours that have characterised operations in LEO. 
 
2. Sustainability defined  
 
In the early days of the Space Age there was little thought of sustainability in any sense of the 
word; launching objects into space and operating the nascent ‘space technology’ in an alien 
and largely unknown environment was enough of a challenge without worrying about 
longevity. This soon changed, of course, as space scientists moved beyond the ‘snapshot’ 
stage of simply wanting to get into orbit and projects demanded hardware that would operate 
long enough to provide data on how aspects of the space environment they were studying 
developed over time. Arguably the first manifestation of ‘space sustainability’, therefore, was 
the sustainability of the hardware. As hardware reliability improved and missions developed 
into programmes – for example, for satellite communications, Earth observation and weather 
forecasting – the sustainability of funding, predominantly from government coffers, became 
a key sustainability issue. This manifestation of the sustainability concept became particularly 
important as the Apollo lunar programme reached its peak and the final three missions were 
cancelled; clearly, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, lunar exploration by humans was not 
politically sustainable9. 
 
Notions of sustainability tie in closely with the emergence of environmentalism as a construct 
of the latter half of the twentieth century. As William Kramer has identified10, the works of 
Carson11, Ehrlich12 and, perhaps of most significance, the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ by 
Garrett Hardin13 all contributed to the recognition that sustainability in a terrestrial context 
was imperative14. The risk identified is broadly that the resources of the Earth might be 
exhausted but also that the wider environment could be damaged beyond nature’s ability to 
repair itself. When considering sustainability in this context, it can be broadly characterised 
as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.’15 The Secure World Foundation has applied this 
to space exploration, suggesting that sustainability of the space environment means ‘Ensuring 
that all humanity can continue to use outer space for peaceful purposes and socioeconomic 
benefit now and in the long term.’16 Indeed, the term ‘space sustainability’ has risen in 
prominence within the space community over the past decade to the point where it has 
become the subject of a United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) “Working 
Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities”. 
 
In general, the language or terminology used with respect to space resources (again, 
predominantly in LEO) has been developing over the past decade or so. Phrases such as ‘space 
situational awareness’, ‘space traffic management’ and ‘space safety’ have been applied to 
the sustainability of satellite systems and space stations in LEO. In other words, ‘space 
sustainability’ increasingly refers to the future sustainability of government, military and 
commercial spacecraft operations in LEO. There is, however, more to outer space than LEO, 
as discussed below. 
 
As has been identified elsewhere17, sustainable development in space requires that all 
participants in space activity must mitigate the harmful effects of their exploration and reduce 
their environmental footprint, so that future ventures do not require additional expenditure 
to mitigate the effects of previous generations. As will be seen, however, despite 
technological and engineering advances, the crucial legal element has been neglected, with 
guidelines and voluntary codes of conduct being used to buttress the OST. Any meaningful 
attempt to embed sustainability within space activity needs to be underpinned with a robust 
and enforceable legal regime. Obtaining the necessary consensus for this is, arguably, as 
formidable a task as any technical challenge. 
 
3. Space exploration and space law 
 
The successful launch of Sputnik 1 in October 1957 launched humanity into the Space Age. In 
the two decades that followed, the international community, under the auspices of the 
United Nations, negotiated a series of general, multilateral treaties that would form the basis 
of international space law. The foundational treaty, which provided the basis for the 
international governance of space activity is the Treaty on the Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, known colloquially as the Outer Space Treaty (OST)18. It was the result of 
deliberations within UNCOPUOS, building on previous resolutions passed within the UN 
General Assembly, and entered into force on 10 October 1967. Created in the shadow of the 
Cold War hostilities between the two dominant superpowers, the United States of America 
and the Soviet Union19, the preamble to the OST betrays many of the concerns that were 
prevalent at the time. It speaks of the need for space to be used for peaceful purposes, and 
of the need for mutual understanding and cooperation.  
 
Despite this historically-specific context, the OST has laid down the normative legal principles 
on which the exploration and use of outer space has been conducted for the last fifty years20. 
These key values are enshrined within the fabric of international law (and arguably the 
customary practice accepted as law21) and encompass such principles as outer space being 
free for exploration and use by all states, the prohibition of claims of sovereignty over outer 
space and the responsibility of states for all activities conducted by both state and non-
governmental entities22. Perhaps of most significance, as identified by Lyall and Larsen, is that 
the OST established the fundamental principle that space is not a lawless frontier, free from 
any legal constraint or principle23.  
 
The principles found in the OST, therefore, form the legal base of current space activity. Yet 
the OST remains a creature of its time. The overriding concern of those drafting the treaty 
and creating the international framework was one of security24. The prevailing geopolitical 
climate has changed markedly in the fifty years since the coming into force of the OST, with 
numerous state and private actors taking part in space activity. Similarly, the focus of the 
activity has appeared to go through a paradigm shift from being the manifestation of military 
superiority by journeys of exploration to that of a commercial activity designed to harness the 
profit potential of space-based applications in low Earth orbit.  As the geopolitical situation 
changed, states turned away from the Moon and focused back on the Earth, in particular the 
‘high ground’ of LEO, a few hundred kilometres above the planet. As a result, it became the 
focus for a small community of space scientists and engineers concerned about the dangers 
posed by the growth of human-made, orbital debris, much of which was derived from launch 
vehicle upper stage explosions.25 
   
Human-derived debris was, largely, not considered as being problematic during the 
pioneering era of the early Space Age26. Indeed, beyond the forward contamination of extra-
terrestrial bodies encapsulated in the phrase ‘planetary protection’, and the protection of 
Earth from so-called ‘backward contamination’ by alien pathogens, environmental awareness 
is largely missing from the binding treaties of space governance27. Accordingly, there is no 
mention of space debris within the OST, nor is there any recognition that states have a duty 
to use the space environment in a manner which is sustainable.  
  
By the time the Space Age was but two decades old, however, it was clear to some observers 
that the debris situation in LEO could reach catastrophic proportions, prompting two such 
experts to publish a paper entitled ‘Collision frequency of artificial satellites: The creation of 
a debris belt’ 28. It warned of a possible ‘collisional cascade effect’ in LEO, now widely known 
as the Kessler Syndrome. This hypothesized that, as the amount of debris objects in a given 
orbit increased, so would the probability of collisions between them, and if a sizeable object 
hit a satellite it could produce hundreds or thousands of additional debris objects, which could 
in turn impact other satellites29. Eventually, this cascade effect would produce the ‘debris 
belt’ foretold in the paper’s subtitle and render the orbit unusable; in terms of its intended 
use, the orbit would become unsustainable. 
 
4. The challenge of orbital debris 
 
The long-term nature of the orbital debris issue poses several challenges to on-going space 
activity, both from a technical and a legal standpoint30. Although the ideas that became 
known as the Kessler Syndrome were first postulated as long ago as 1978, it was not until the 
formation of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) in 1993 that 
guidelines for debris mitigation began to take shape. These guidelines were built upon by 
UNCOPUOS and in 2007 the UN Debris Mitigation Guidelines were issued. However, it was 
only in 2002 that these guidelines were approved by space agencies and submitted to the UN; 
they were finally approved by the UN’s Science and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) in 2007. 
At the time, a UNCOPUOS report acknowledged that “it has been a common understanding 
that the current space debris environment poses a risk to spacecraft in Earth orbit.”31 Despite 
these warnings, and a number of academic texts devoted to the subject32, the concept of 
sustainable development of the space environment has not received the necessary political 
attention.  
Despite the clear evidence that space debris represents the primary threat to humanity’s 
continued use of the extraterrestrial environment, states continue to behave in a way that 
generates more debris and the desire for rigorous debris-management regulation binding on 
all space users is worryingly deficient. The governance difficulties of managing debris are 
almost as significant as the technical ones. Hobe suggests that, if the ‘soft’ guidelines are 
discounted, the OST does not explicitly render the creation of space debris unlawful33. Whilst 
it has been argued that actively creating debris, or stubbornly refusing to remove debris could 
be viewed as interfering with free access to space under Art I OST and possibly harmful 
contamination under Art IX of the OST, such concerns have not been tested by states34. Debris 
mitigation governance therefore resides in the arena of voluntary international codes of 
conduct and there are currently no legally enforceable provisions limiting the amount of 
debris at the design stage of the mission.  
The major space agencies recognize that the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines are an 
example of ‘best practice’ and represent a prudent first step towards limiting future orbital 
debris.35 Such recognition, however, falls short of full-scale, universal adoption. Indeed, 
within the text of the regulations, it is made clear that these are guidelines and are not legally 
binding under international law36. 
 
By contrast, work undertaken by national space agencies and the IADC indicates that there is 
no shortage of recognition amongst the spacefaring community that orbital debris is a 
problem37. This has led to international collaboration on mitigation technologies and the 
sharing of best practice (including the passivation of spacecraft elements such as batteries 
and propulsion systems and deorbiting spacecraft where possible). Coupled with the wider 
discussion occurring within the UN, there is, therefore, some cause for optimism. A nascent 
normative position in respect of the dangers posed by orbital debris to the future viability of 
space activity is clearly emerging via these mitigation guidelines38, based on a need to reduce 
current debris and limit future debris39.  
 
More problematic from a legal perspective, as well as being technically more challenging, is 
the issue of debris remediation, i.e. the active removal of debris from densely populated orbit 
regions40. Remediation is missing entirely from the UN guidelines and, indeed, any other 
instrument regulating space debris management. Just as the technology to effect the safe 
removal of redundant, non-functional satellites and other debris from LEO remains highly 
experimental41, the accompanying legal framework poses some formidable obstacles to 
cleaning up Earth orbit. The OST legal framework is based upon responsibility for 
authorization, liability and on-going control of space objects being imposed upon named, 
launching states. Those responsibilities do not cease once an object has ceased to function. 
However, as mentioned previously, there is no corresponding duty on the launching state to 
remove a satellite or piece of debris from orbit once it has ended its useful life.  
 
The conundrum for those seeking to engage in remedial activities is two-fold. First, any actor, 
be it private or public sector, will need to secure the permission of the launching state before 
engaging in debris remediation. States may be reluctant to grant this as, currently, 
remediation activity remains hazardous and may result in damage to another space object. 
Liability for any damage caused by a space object (including financial liability for damage 
caused by space debris and the cost incurred by any attempt at removal from orbit) will be 
on the launching state. Most of the spacefaring states, are therefore obviously less inclined 
to accept liability for space debris, including liability for in-orbit damages and removal costs, 
and feel that the responsibility for removal belongs to all states, including the associated 
costs42. Clearly, this is an area where consensus will be both vital and yet extremely difficult 
to obtain without nations adopting a more altruistic approach than is currently observed.  
 
The need for international consensus and cooperation on the issue of debris management 
has never been greater. If the sustainability of LEO cannot be addressed, then other, broader 
concerns regarding the sustainability of the fragile space environment may well be moot. A 
debris cloud in LEO renders access to space difficult and, ultimately, perhaps almost 
impossible. The need for sustainability in this context is clear: ensuring that LEO remains 
viable for future generations, whilst satisfying the needs of the present. As has been outlined 
above, the current legal framework for space activity (and specifically the OST) is silent on this 
issue. Given the risk to space activity from debris, this continued silence is no longer an 
acceptable response. The ready-made consensus on debris mitigation should embolden 
states to tackle the technical and legal challenges of remediation collectively. Any consensus 
that embeds sustainability as a core concern will undoubtedly be to the benefit of future 
generations.  
 
5. Sustainability challenges beyond LEO 
 
The case has been made for the need to urgently ensure that all activity in LEO prioritises the 
protection of that important orbital environmental. This discussion has already illustrated the 
significance of inter-agency collaboration through which debris mitigation guidelines have 
been published43 and are, at least to some extent, adhered to44. In practical terms, this 
reflects the inherent ‘value’ the space community places on LEO. It appears, however, that 
this is only acquired once the asset is at risk of becoming unavailable – for example, due to 
the onset of the Kessler Syndrome. Although satellite manufacturers and operators recognise 
the commercial value of geostationary orbital positions and specify measures to remove 
satellites to the so-called ‘graveyard orbit’ at the end of their lives, the smaller debris 
population in GEO makes the situation less urgent. Indeed, some satellites are still left to drift 
uncontrolled across the geostationary arc providing potential ammunition for future 
collisions45. 
 
Unfortunately, the lack of affordable technology to remove satellites entirely from the 
geostationary environment has made the graveyard orbit (a mere 300km or so above GEO, 
which itself is 36,000km above the Earth) the best option. As has been pointed out 
previously46, depending on future launch rates, between 10 and 20 defunct satellites could 
be added to the graveyard each year, which would amount to 500-1000 in 50 years (which is 
double the current age of the satcoms era). The fact that these satellites are abandoned and 
uncontrolled implies that a collision will one day occur in the graveyard, producing debris that 
will intersect the geostationary ring and threaten operational satellites.  
 
In many respects the predilection towards sustainability of Earth’s orbital resources, as 
opposed to more distance resources, is hardly surprising. Human space exploration, unlike 
robotic exploration, has been ‘stuck in LEO’ since December 1972, when Apollo 17 returned 
from the Moon. This absence of crewed space missions beyond LEO since that time47 would 
tend to suggest that, in terms of sustainable operations, the mainstream space community 
mind-set has also, until recently, been confined to LEO48. There are several reasons for this. 
Firstly, it is easier to consider short-term issues than to extrapolate into a relatively unknown 
future. Secondly, it is more acceptable (especially in a constrained financial environment) to 
consider practical sustainability issues, rather than ‘what if’ scenarios. Thirdly, space 
professionals under the age of 45 have lived only in a world bound by the limitations of human 
travel to low Earth orbit, much as their forebears did before December 1968 when Apollo 8 
travelled to the Moon. It is perhaps equally understandable, therefore, that international 
attempts at regulating the lunar environment, in the form of the Moon Treaty of 197949, have 
been equally unsuccessful50. Nations have both lacked the will to form a consensus and have 
engaged in disputes as to how any minerals harvested from the Moon should be apportioned. 
In respect of technical accomplishments and law and policy focus, lunar exploration has 
regressed rather than progressed51. 
 
Nevertheless, history has shown that when technical, financial and political factors align 
favourably, resources can be mobilised and developments can take place quickly (and often 
without much thought of the consequences). Those with interests in protecting the space 
environment and thereby ensuring its availability for future generations typically take a 
longer-term view of the space sustainability issue. It is always difficult to predict the future, 
but it seems sensible to assume that, when humans again travel beyond LEO, the Moon will 
be among the early destinations (not least because it is only three days away). Amidst the 
virtual moratorium on government lunar landing missions, the Google Lunar X-Prize 
(announced in September 2007) has seemed the most likely mechanism for lunar missions 
for many years. The concept of a commercial rover that could potentially visit the historic 
Apollo landing sites, and possibly despoil them, has exercised those interested in preservation 
since the announcement52. Although future development under the X-Prize banner is 
currently unclear, it is likely that at least one contender will conduct a mission in due course53.      
 
Before that, it is likely that another Chinese rover will be deployed on the lunar surface 
following the planned 2018 launch of the Chang’e-4 mission. This renewed interest in lunar 
exploration spearheaded by China is significant, not so much for the use of near-side, robotic 
rovers, but for plans to explore the far side54. As the Moon is in ‘captured rotation’ about the 
Earth, it presents the same side towards Earth at all times; so a lander, rover or lunar base on 
the far side will require a communications relay satellite to maintain contact with Earth. This 
could be provided by a single lunar satellite (for intermittent communications), a constellation 
of satellites, or a spacecraft at the L2 Earth-Moon Lagrange point. Whatever the technical 
solution, this begs the question of sustainability of the communications link and the future 
sustainability of the putative lunar base. And since lunar orbit is as much a part of the space 
environment as Earth orbit, this automatically feeds the debate on the sustainability of the 
space environment (at least for the practical needs of communication). Given that we have a 
problem with space debris in Earth orbit, it is not too much of a leap to foresee a potential 
problem with debris in lunar orbit. 
 
Although a discussion of the orbital dynamics that make a stationary orbit (cf. geostationary 
orbit) around the Moon impossible is beyond the purview of this piece, it is worth pointing 
out that a future lunar communications system would most likely involve a constellation of 
many satellites. The same is true for a lunar version of the Global Positioning System, which 
would be necessary because the Moon has no magnetic field to attract a compass needle. As 
a result, any significant human development of the Moon will eventually require a population 
of satellites in low and medium altitude orbits of various inclinations from equatorial to polar. 
It would be complacent to believe that such a scenario offered no possibility of orbital debris, 
so sustainability of the systems and of the orbital resource itself would have to be considered. 
 
This suggests the need for debris mitigation measures for lunar orbit analogous to those 
already available for low Earth orbit. Unfortunately, one of the key solutions for LEO – 
deorbiting – is not so readily acceptable for lunar orbit because it has an arguably greater 
environmental impact for the Moon than it does for Earth. Since the Moon has no 
atmosphere, spacecraft and debris will impact the surface intact rather than burning-up and 
disintegrating en route; and, of course, ‘ocean disposal’ is not an option. And whereas the 
Earth’s environment has a natural ability to repair itself, the lunar environment does not and 
will bear the scars of any impact for the foreseeable future55.  In this sense, the Moon can be 
considered a ‘more fragile’ environment than the Earth. 
 
When considering specific examples of environmental damage from space debris, or indeed 
from mining, it is accepted that not all analogies to pollution on Earth are directly applicable 
to outer space activity. In respect of lunar orbital debris, whether the appearance of ‘yet 
another crater’ on the Moon ‘matters’, the possibility of impact in a ‘developed area’ must 
be considered, as must the option of a dedicated ‘impact zone’ for discarded spacecraft. Of 
course, this ignores the possibility of unintended and uncontrolled entries and argues for the 
active removal of defunct satellites from lunar orbit. In respect of the damage caused by 
mining, as stated above, the contamination to the lunar environment will be far more 
enduring than on Earth.  
 
It is, of course, not just the Moon that is being posited as a possible location of future human 
activity in space. Already there are ambitious plans to mine Near Earth Asteroids by 
companies such as Planetary Resources56 which are looking to ‘prospect’ for resources on 
bodies such as Ceres. Perhaps most ambitiously, in his keynote speech to the annual 
International Astronautical Congress in Guadalajara in September 2016, Elon Musk outlined 
ambitious plans for the colonisation of Mars within the next century57. Each one of the 
projects presents significant technical challenges, but, as befits such ambitious plans, these 
technical challenges are matched by legal and policy questions. Moreover, prospective 
missions to celestial bodies other than the Moon will pose difficulties in respect of crew 
management on long-distance spaceflight that have yet to be adequately addressed58. 
6. Embedding sustainability in future exploration 
 
Not all space resource missions are necessarily purely profit driven or commercially focused. 
For example, the Chinese state-sponsored Chang’e missions involve an assessment of 
potential resource benefits59. Nevertheless, the scale of Chinese lunar objectives, coupled 
with the ambition shown by numerous commercial ventures, illustrate the need to begin 
embedding sustainability into the normative rules underpinning any future development of 
the Moon and other celestial bodies. The current regulation of lunar activities, indeed all the 
environmental provisions of international space law, have been extensively criticized, in all 
respects, as being inadequate60. The Moon Treaty was promulgated in 1979 and to date only 
17 countries have ratified the agreement. No states with human spaceflight capability 
(specifically USA, Russia or China) are party to the treaty and as such it is a treaty that both 
lacks consensus and traction in international space law61. The Moon Treaty develops the 
limited environmental provisions of Art IX of the OST62. Viikari notes, however, that the Moon 
Treaty, like all the UN treaties has little in respect of environmental issues due to the fact that 
‘…at the time of their conclusion, such considerations were not among the highest-ranking 
items on the agendas of space faring nations.’63  
 
The lack of progress over embedding a sustainable and legally binding framework for the 
exploitation of bodies within the solar system could prove extremely damaging for future 
generations. It is argued that peaceful, scientific exploration of the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, supported by a fundamental commitment to limiting human-made degradation of the 
lunar environment is desirable as the cornerstone of a new treaty. Furthermore, these 
principles are far from unattainable given the consensus that already exists. A framework 
which provides for sustainable, environmentally sensitive scientific exploration of the Moon 
should chime with the current recognition of the need for guidelines for the mitigation of 
orbital debris. It should also be noted that, despite the criticism of the Moon Treaty, much of 
the substance of the 1979 Treaty is no more than a restatement of the principles outlined in 
the 1967 Treaty64.  
 
Sustainability in activities beyond LEO, on other celestial bodies, is an area where there is time 
for technical and legal professionals to work in harmony to provide optimal solutions whereby 
the needs of the present can be satisfied without compromising the viability of future 
exploration and development. The question is, with the promise of lucrative mineral 
resources, whether interested parties – state or private - will be prepared to wait for 
consensus to emerge. If the lure of access to mineral wealth proves too great, given the 
ambiguity inherent in the OST, states may seek to legislate on an individual basis leading to a 
fragmented approach to sustainability and fragmentary protection for the fragile space 
environment. Sadly, this may already be the direction of travel as, in November 2015, the US 
Government passed The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act65 (hereinafter, Space 
Act 2015) that inter alia promotes “the right of U.S. citizens to engage in commercial 
exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources”66. Indeed, the act goes on to 
provide that US companies and citizens shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space 
resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use and sell it per applicable law. 
 
There have been diverging opinions as to the compatibility of the Space Act 2015 with 
international law, specifically whether it conflicts with the non-appropriation provisions of 
Art. II of the OST67. Equally concerning, however, must be the absence of any environmental 
regulation of celestial mining within the Space Act. Terrestrial experiences illustrate that there 
is no such thing as environmentally sensitive mining68. Yet consensus on the distribution of 
mineral resources predominate in discussions of regulating space activity beyond LEO. It is 
suggested that this is illustrative of the problems facing all advocates of sustainable 
development: when placed against the need to generate profit and mercantile opportunities, 
sustainability becomes an afterthought rather than a fundamental concept. Such a mind-set 
is a serious barrier to embedding sustainable practices within space activity. 
 
7. Ethics and values in space policy 
 
So far this inquiry into sustainability within space activity presents something of a 
disheartening picture. Where sustainable practices are recognised as being warranted (e.g. in 
LEO to combat space debris), it would appear to be a case of ‘too little, too late’; where they 
are not yet recognised, perhaps because that part of the space environment has yet to be 
developed, it is a case of ‘too early’. Where the activity is part of a bold vision of the future, 
the focus is upon enrichment and colonisation rather than environmental harmony. For 
historical reasons, the underlying space governance framework is mired in the geopolitics of 
the Cold War and not reflective of the current multi-sectored space industry.  It is suggested 
that part of the reason sustainability has not embedded itself within mainstream space 
activity is because it was not embedded within the normative behaviour promoted by the 
space treaties. It is the purpose of this element of the discussion to relocate the underlying 
environmental values that could form the basis of a sustainability policy, feeding into a 
revivified system of space governance. 
 
A starting point for this is the fundamental question concerning the moral relationship 
between humanity and the space environment. Specifically, whether there is an ethical 
obligation to respect or constrain activities on celestial bodies, and to what extent this should 
impact upon what humanity then chooses to do in space69. This is a logical starting point as 
any value system is based on accepted standards and needs to reflect what the community 
considered to be ‘right’. The belief that space ethics, environmentalism and sustainability are 
part of the same nexus is possibly due to the conflation of these ideas by writers such as 
Eugene Hargrove70 who examined notions of inherent value as it relates to terraforming71. 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the majority of those involved in space activity have given 
primacy to achievement of mission objectives over the environmental impact of that 
achievement.  
 
In the early days of space exploration, the goal was simply ‘getting there’; achieving that goal 
was difficult enough without having to worry about the space environment. However, now 
that the technology is more mature, and thus more reliable, and the cost of doing so shows 
signs of decreasing, it is time for a correspondingly enlightened attitude towards that 
environment. Drawing on the example of terrestrial environmentalism, it is clear that there 
is broad agreement on the need to avoid or reduce pollution in that there are policies and 
treaties in place to protect at least parts of the terrestrial environment. Yet, as can be seen 
from the final iteration of the Space Act 2015, such policies and treaties continue to be 
vigorously challenged as they impose unwelcome regulation on companies and governments. 
There is no reason that the value system of terrestrial environmentalism should not be 
extended to the space environment such that parts of it are protected, either because they 
deserve protection or because it is in the best interests of the user community.  
 
Although the sustainability of LEO appears, at last, to be part of the value system for the space 
environment, the sustainability of GEO and the graveyard orbit has yet to be included. Given 
that the protection of geostationary assets is a purely pragmatic aspiration, there is little 
cause for optimism that altruism will triumph over self-interest when it comes to protecting 
the surfaces, features and general environment of distant celestial bodies. In such cases, out 
of sight may truly mean out of mind. The promotion of sustainability as a core value in space 
activity becomes ever more urgent when considering the planning and development of such 
missions. This bottom-up approach - embedding sustainability within actual missions as a 
starting point - may succeed in creating a broad consensus, in much the way that debris 
mitigation within mission planning for LEO is now broadly embedded.  
 
Additionally, there is a growing recognition amongst those outside the immediate space 
community that the topic of space sustainability and environmental protection has support: 
according to the results of the first ‘Citizens’ Debate on Space for Europe’, organised by ESA 
in November 2016, feedback from the 2000 participants included the conclusion that “84% 
think space should be protected from polluting and potentially harmful human activities”72. 
While this is interesting anecdotal background, it is unlikely to carry much weight among 
those who wish to profit from the development of the space environment. Space activities 
remain difficult and expensive, so additional financial outlay on environmental protection 
measures may not be welcome.  
 
The OST is entering its 50th year and has been criticised extensively by academics and 
practitioners alike for failing to reflect the modern reality of space activity73. Yet, we have 
experienced more than 50 years of peace in outer space, there has been no perceived threat 
from orbital nuclear weapons, and states have (broadly) adhered to the normative values laid 
down in the treaty. State responsibility for space activity is entrenched within both custom 
and practice of space activity and there is a presumption that no state can make territorial 
claims in outer space74. The US Space Act 2015 goes out of its way to illustrate that it is 
complying with existing international law. Similarly, private companies, such as Moon Express 
and its founder Bob Richards have spent both time and money in ensuring that commercial 
activities comply with, not only the terms of the OST, but also the underlying spirit75. The 
great shame is that the OST was drafted at a time when environmentalism, as we know it 
today, was in its infancy. It is tempting to speculate whether sustainability could have become 
part of normative space regulation had it been embedded within the OST. 
 
Regrettably, the portents for successful negotiation of a new, overarching space treaty to 
replace the OST are not good. As Danilenko identifies, rather than channelling consensus, the 
uncertain political reality of the world at present means that a comprehensive space treaty is 
likely to encounter serious political opposition76. Despite the change in both the 
sophistication of the technology and the nature of the participants, there has been a lack of 
binding international space law over the last four decades, despite an increase in space 
activity. Recent political events such as the imminent British exit from the European Union 
(Brexit) have shown that all-encompassing international treaties have fallen out of favour as 
states prefer more agile individual agreements77.  
 
Regarding the space environment, Yasushi Horikawa, former chair of the UNCOPUOS, states: 
“All the space actors must behave responsibly to ensure sustainable use of outer space. For 
this again, international cooperation is necessary and advanced space-faring nations should 
consider capacity building for the long-term sustainability of outer space.”78  There is a place 
for non-binding agreements and soft provisions; they operate in areas such as planetary 
protection and form the basis of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The use 
of non-binding codes of conduct and guidelines (such as the UN Debris Mitigation Guidelines) 
can go some way towards filling the gap and shaping normative behaviour. 
 
However, these ‘soft mechanisms’ may be of little use in persuading private space actors, 
more focused on return on investment and potential profits than on embedding 
environmental sustainability. The debate on space sustainability is far from over. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Sustainability and sustainable development are terms that tend to be used without any clear 
indication as to what sustainability means; all too often, they are catch-all terms devoid of 
specific goals beyond a vague reference to an ecological ideal. This inquiry has reaffirmed 
that, in a space context, sustainable development is a specific requirement to satisfy the 
needs of current space missions while ensuring the viability of future ventures. In concert 
with that, sustainability should mean that minimising harm to the environment becomes part 
of the mission objectives alongside other technical and scientific goals; it is, however, argued 
that, beyond LEO applications and beyond the field of biological contamination summarised 
in the term ‘planetary protection’, this is too rarely the case in practice.  
More positively, the exploration of space is currently driven by factors other than a race to 
showcase competing ideologies and there exists an opportunity for dialogue among all actors, 
both public and private sector, in both developed and developing nations, to ensure an 
orderly and equitable exploration of space. It is suggested that the lessons learned from space 
activity in LEO and GEO mean that this dialogue needs to be predicated on an underpinning 
value system that recognises and respects the fragile nature of the space environment.  
Specifically, the emerging consensus on orbital debris should be channelled into more robust 
action and its focus extended beyond LEO. Clearly, replicating current behaviours beyond LEO 
will lead to similar environmental issues that are being witnessed there today. The Earth has 
a natural mechanism to deal with debris from space; the Moon does not, and this must be 
recognised in any plans for lunar development. Similarly, the prospect of riches from the sky 
must not blind policy makers and mission planners to the environmental harm that any form 
of mining can cause. Although cautionary in tone, this discussion has illustrated that by 
recognizing the need for sustainable practices from the outset, individual missions and 
ventures can incorporate environmental protection and sustainable practices as integral 
mission objectives79.  
The move from state actors to a multi-sectored space activity poses difficult regulatory 
questions that will need to be addressed. For example, relying solely on regulation to 
accomplish the paradigm shift from ‘simply achieving the outcome’ to ‘incorporating 
harmony with the environment as part of the outcome’ is unlikely to work. Those responsible 
for space activity should, instead, look to import sustainable values and try to create a shared 
understanding that becomes codified through regulation, rather than derived from it. 
Fundamentally, if space activity is to be sustainable for future generations, the different 
values that underpin state activity and commercial activity will need to be reconciled with the 
need for respect for the fragile space environment.  
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